Understanding the relationship between human rights abuse, state dysfunction and postcolonial sovereignty in Africa by Greffrath, Wynand
 2017 | https://doi.org/10.19108/KOERS.82.1.2307 Page 1 of 19
Original Research www.koersjournal.org.za
AUTHOR: 
W. Greffrath
AFFILIATION: 
Research Focus Area: Social 
Transformation, North-West 
University, Potchefstroom Campus
CORRESPONDENCE TO: 
Wynand Greffrath
EMAIL: 
wynandgreffrath@gmail.com
POSTAL ADDRESS: 
Office G14, Building F13, North-West 
University, Potchefstroom Campus, 11 
Hoffman Street, Potchefstroom, 2520
DATES: 
Published: 05 Oct. 2017
HOW TO CITE THIS ARTICLE:  
Greffrath, W., 2017,  
‘Understanding the relationship 
between human rights abuse, 
state dysfunction and postcolonial 
sovereignty in Africa’, Koers – Bulletin 
for Christian Scholarship 82(1), 
Available at https://doi.org/10.19108/
KOERS.82.1.2307
COPYRIGHT: 
© 2017. The Author(s). 
Published under  the Creative 
Commons Attribution License.
Understanding the relationship 
between human rights abuse, 
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Abstract
This article explores the interrelationship between the phenomena of state dysfunction, human 
rights abuse and postcolonial states in the African context.  The incidence and extent of state 
dysfunction and human rights abuse are evaluated empirically, which reveals that dysfunctional 
states in Africa are generally guilty of neglecting and violating human rights.  In attempting to 
understand this apparent correlation, the politico-juridical construct of negative sovereignty, 
as formulated by Robert Jackson, is analysed with specific reference to postcolonial African 
states.  The analysis suggests, paradoxically, that dysfunctional states may utilise the same 
normative precepts that served as justifications for decolonisation (such as self-determination 
and non-intervention) to obfuscate or obstruct the scrutiny of human rights domestically. From 
these insights it is posited that functional states, both in institutional and political terms, may 
serve as the most effective bulwark of human rights in Africa, and that the phenomenon of state 
dysfunction as it relates to domestic human rights violations warrants more consideration.
Keywords:  Africa; Human rights; Negative sovereignty; Postcolonial sovereignty; Quasi-states; 
State dysfunction.
Opsomming
In hierdie artikel word die verhouding tussen staatsverval en menseregteskendings in post-
koloniale Afrika verken. Die voorkoms en omvang van beide fenomene word empiries 
geëvalueer, waarna die gevolgtrekking gemaak word dat swak- en disfunksionele state in 
die algemeen skuldig is aan menseregteskendings. Ten einde hierdie korrelasie te verstaan, 
word Robert Jackson se polities-juridiese konstruk van ‘negatiewe soewereiniteit’ ingespan 
met spesifieke verwysing na post-koloniale Afrikastate. Die uitkoms van hierdie analise dui 
op ŉ paradoks deurdat disfunksionele state dikwels gebruik maak van dieselfde normatiewe 
voorskrifte wat dekolonisering destyds gemotiveer het in hul pogings om kontemporêre 
menseregteskendings op eie bodem te verdoesel of te verdedig. Vanuit hierdie standpunt 
word daar aangevoer dat funksionele state, in beide politieke en institusionele terme, die mees 
doeltreffende teenvoeter vir menseregteskendings in Afrika mag wees en dat die problematiek 
van staatsverval ook spesifiek beskou moet word vanuit ŉ menseregteperspektief. 
Sleutelterme:  Afrika; menseregte; negative soewereiniteit; post-koloniale soewereiniteit; kwasi-
state; stat-disfunksie.
1. Introduction and points of departure
In one of the first and most influential pieces of writing on the (then) emerging 
phenomenon of failed states, Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner (1992:3) dolefully noted 
that: 
From Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia in Europe, 
from Somalia, Sudan, and Liberia in Africa to Cambodia in Southeast Asia, 
a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly 
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incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community... As 
those states descend into violence and anarchy – imperilling their own citizens 
and threatening their neighbours through refugee flows, political instability, and 
random warfare – it is becoming clear that something must be done.  The massive 
abuses of human rights – including that most basic of rights, the right to life – are 
distressing enough, but the need to help those states is made more critical by the 
evidence that their problems tend to spread.
More than two decades after the appearance of this seminal article, the dilemma of 
dysfunctional states in the developing world, and in Africa in particular, has grown more 
acute – along with the human rights abuses that are perpetrated in such places.
The purpose of this article is to explore and understand the interrelationship between three 
variables: (i) state dysfunction, (ii) postcolonial states and (iii) human rights.  Furthermore, this 
article will consider these variables specifically in the African context.  This will be achieved 
through a theory-driven qualitative analysis of sovereignty as it manifests in dysfunctional 
and postcolonial states in Africa, applying the construct of ‘negative sovereignty’ devised by 
the legal scholar Robert Jackson.  Contemporary data on state dysfunction and human rights 
abuses in Africa are utilised as a means of empirical verification.  As a point of departure, 
certain key concepts that are integral to this article are delineated below.
1.1 Sovereignty
International legal sovereignty denotes the status of a political entity in the international 
system.  Recognition of such sovereignty implies that a state has juridical equality, that its 
diplomats are entitled to immunity, and that its embassies and consulates have extraterritorial 
status, and that it has the ability to enter into agreements with other sovereignty entities 
(Krasner, 2001:9).  A general understanding of the concept in contemporary international 
law is that:
Sovereignty in the sense of contemporary public international law denotes the 
basic international legal status of a state that is not subject, within its territorial 
jurisdiction, to the governmental, executive, legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of 
a foreign state or to foreign law other than public international law (Steinberger, 
1987:414).  
These notions of sovereignty in international law speak to the juridical nature of the concept 
as a signifier of independence.  However, authentic sovereignty should be complemented by 
the de facto attribute of supremacy – in other words, that the state possesses an authority 
that is supreme in relation to all other authorities in the same territorial jurisdiction (Jackson, 
2007:10).  The requirement of domestic supremacy speaks to sovereignty as an empirical 
quality, one that is not merely a conferrable status (such as juridical independence) but an 
empirical attribute.  In relation to this, Jackson refers to sovereignty’s ‘Janus-faced’ nature 
– simultaneously facing inward towards the citizens of a given state, and outward at other 
states in the international community (Jackson, 2007:11).  Accounting for the dualist nature 
of sovereignty is pivotal to evaluating and understanding the predicament of dysfunctional 
states in the developing world, as will be demonstrated subsequently.
1.2 Dysfunctional states
The most widely adopted contemporary conceptualisation of the state is that of Max Weber’s, 
which holds that a polity may be considered a state if it possesses an administration of which 
the different parts are coordinated; if it acts as a compulsory association that can claim 
binding authority over all that occurs within its demarcated territory; being able to do so 
through means of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Weber & Parsons, 1947:156). 
Proceeding from this definition, a dysfunctional state is conceptualised as a fundamental 
deviation from the ideal-typical Weberian conception of state (of which the dysfunctional 
attributes manifest in the societal, institutional and international domains) that:
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• may be represented according to a typology of dysfunction, incorporating 
differentiated graduations; 
• is often encountered as a postcolonial phenomenon; 
• is essentially characterised by a deficiency in the capability to predominate 
as an autonomous, legitimate and authoritative political institution
• is therefore not authentically (positively) sovereign in either domestic or 
international spheres; and  
• as a result is incapable and/or unwilling to fulfil the functions of state in the 
public interest and for the public good (Greffrath, 2015:27).
This conceptualisation of the dysfunctional state will serve as point of departure in the 
analysis of the phenomena of state dysfunction and human rights, conducted subsequently.
1.3 Human rights
In accordance with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), ‘human rights’ is 
conceptualised as being subjective rights to which individuals are entitled by virtue of being 
human (UN, 1948).  These rights are stipulated in the UDHR and other treaties, including the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR).  Additionally, UN General Assembly Resolution 
1514 (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples)  is 
also of relevance for this article, insofar as it represented the extension and application 
of the international human rights regime towards the end of terminating the practice of 
colonialism.
2. State dysfunction and human rights: Occurrence and 
correspondence
Non-governmental organisations have, for some time, monitored the status of the 
abovementioned aspects in the international arena and their findings have proven to 
be valuable, particularly in instances where states themselves have not shouldered the 
burden in providing adequate reporting and accountability on human rights issues.  The 
problematic nature of the interface between dysfunctional states and human rights has 
been corroborated by international NGOs, and a cursory evaluation of their insights into 
contemporary dysfunctional states reveals a correlation with deficits in the values which 
buttress human rights, such as the rule of law, political and civil liberties and human 
freedom.
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Table 1 - Comparison of Fragile States Index and Freedom in the World data (high and very 
high alert states)
 
 Fragile States Index 
[2015] 
Human 
Rights and 
Rule of Law 
Freedom in 
the World 
[2015] 
Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
1 South Sudan 10 Not Free 7 6 
2 Somalia 10 Not Free 7 7 
3 Central African Republic 10 Not Free 7 7 
4 Sudan 9.6 Not Free 7 7 
5 D.R. of Congo 10 Not Free 6 6 
6 Chad 9.4 Not Free 7 6 
7 Yemen 9.1 Not Free 6 6 
8 Syria 10 Not Free 7 7 
9 Afghanistan 8.6 Not Free 6 6 
10 Guinea 8.4 Partly Free 5 5 
11 Haiti 7.4 Partly Free 5 6 
12 Iraq 8.9 Not Free 6 6 
13 Pakistan 8.4 Partly Free 4 5 
14 Nigeria 8.8 Partly Free 4 5 
15 Cote d’Ivoire 7.9 Partly Free 4 5 
16 Zimbabwe 7.3 Not Free 5 6 
The table above combines selected content of two separate reports, namely the 2015 Fragile 
States Index (FSI), compiled by the Fund for Peace, and the 2015 Freedom in the World (FIW) 
report, published by Freedom House.  Both these sources are regarded as authoritative 
international barometers of their respective domains of inquiry.  The 16 tabulated states 
are those that that have been designated by the FSI as being on High Alert (states 6-16, 
above) and Very High Alert (states 1-5, above).  According to the FSI methodology, these 
states ‘display features that make significant parts of their societies and institutions 
vulnerable to failure’ (Fund for Peace, 2015).  One of the 12 primary indicators employed 
by the FSI (amongst others such as state legitimacy, public services, factionalised elites 
and the state security apparatus) is that of human rights and the rule of law, regarding 
which the FSI argues that ‘when human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the 
state is failing in its ultimate responsibility’ (own emphasis) and incorporates pressures and 
dynamics related to press freedom, civil liberties, political freedoms, human trafficking, 
political prisoners, incarceration, religious persecution, torture and executions (Fund for 
Peace, 2015).  Similarly, the Freedom in the World report utilises two categories to provide 
a hybrid picture of states, relating to both their functionality and the status of human rights 
within their borders.  Political rights concerns aspects such as the integrity of the electoral 
process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government, whilst civil 
liberties are evaluated in terms of the freedom of expression and belief, associational and 
organisational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom 
House, 2016).  When combined, the complementary perspectives of the FSI and FIW report 
provide a comprehensive evaluation of the status of human rights in the dysfunctional 
states of the world.
When the aforementioned sixteen fragile or dysfunctional states and their respective 
human rights credentials are compared to the states classified as ‘very sustainable’ and 
‘sustainable’ by the Fragile States Index, a clear relationship is demonstrated between the 
variables of state functionality/integrity and human rights:
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Table 2 - Comparison of Fragile States Index and Freedom in the World data (sustainable and 
very sustainable states)
 Fragile States 
Index [2015] 
Human 
Rights and 
Rule of Law 
Freedom in 
the World 
[2015] 
Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
178 Finland 0.9 Free 1 1 
177 Sweden 1.0 Free 1 1 
176 Norway 1.3 Free 1 1 
175 Denmark 1.3 Free 1 1 
174 Luxembourg 1.0 Free 1 1 
173 Switzerland 1.8 Free 1 1 
172 New Zealand 1.0 Free 1 1 
171 Iceland 1.1 Free 1 1 
170 Australia 2.4 Free 1 1 
169 Ireland 1.2 Free 1 1 
168 Canada 1.8 Free 1 1 
167 Austria 1.7 Free 1 1 
166 Netherlands 1.0 Free 1 1 
165 Germany 1.5 Free 1 1 
164 Portugal 2.3 Free 1 1 
 
It is evident that, whereas dysfunctional states exhibit poor human rights credentials, the 
contrary is true of functional states, which score highly for human rights, rule of law, political 
rights and civil liberties. 
Noting this, three features emerge as significant.  Firstly, there appears to be a relationship 
between the variables of state dysfunction on the one hand, and the erosion of human rights 
on the other.  This observation recalls Weber’s conceptualisation of the state, according to 
which the paramount function of the state is essentially to act as guarantor of safety to 
those who reside within its borders.  Dysfunctional states are unable to fulfil such a role, 
both in relation to domestic and external threats to human rights.  Secondly, a significant 
preponderance of the dysfunctional states that are characterised by poor human rights 
records are encountered in the developing world (with ten of the 16 states being African), 
whilst the six most dysfunctional states are located in Africa.  The current challenges 
surrounding human rights in these states are confirmed by Amnesty International:
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Table 3 – Amnesty International notes on human rights incidents in six dysfunctional African 
states
FSI 2015 
Ranking 
State Extracts from Amnesty International Notes for 2014/15i 
1 South Sudan In August, after more than 20 months of intermittent negotiations, South Sudan’s 
warring parties finally agreed to the terms of a wide-ranging peace agreement. 
However, despite the peace agreement and a subsequent ceasefire declaration, 
conflict continued in several parts of the country, although at a lower intensity than 
previously. All parties flouted international human rights and international humanitarian 
law during the fighting, but no one was held accountable for crimes under international 
law committed in the context of the internal armed conflict. Security agents repressed 
independent and critical voices from the opposition, media and civil society. 
2 Somalia Over 500 people were killed or injured by armed conflict and generalized violence, and 
at least 50,000 people were displaced. All parties to the conflict were responsible for 
crimes under international law and human rights violations, which remained 
unpunished. Armed groups continued to conscript children, and abduct, torture and 
unlawfully kill civilians. Rape and other forms of sexual violence were widespread. 
Continued conflict, insecurity and restrictions imposed by the warring parties hampered 
aid agencies’ access to some regions. 
3 Central African 
Republic 
Crimes under international law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
were committed by all parties to the conflict. Many of those suspected of criminal 
responsibility for crimes under international law, including commanders of the Séléka 
and anti-Balaka forces, as well as other militias and their allies, were yet to be 
effectively investigated or brought to justice. According to the UN and relief 
organizations, 2.7 million people remained in need of humanitarian assistance, 
including more than 460,000 internally displaced people and 452,000 refugees in 
neighbouring countries. 
4 Sudan The authorities repressed the media, civil society organizations and opposition political 
parties, severely curtailing freedoms of expression, association and assembly. Armed 
conflict in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states continued to cause mass 
displacement and civilian casualties; human rights abuses were perpetrated by all 
parties to these conflicts. Government forces destroyed civilian buildings, including 
schools, hospitals and clinics in conflict areas, and obstructed humanitarian access to 
civilians needing support because of the ongoing hostilities. 
5 D.R. of Congo Government repression of protests against attempts by President Kabila to run for the 
presidency beyond the two terms allowed by the Constitution intensified. Violations of 
the rights to freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly increased. 
Human rights defenders, youth activists and politicians were threatened, harassed, 
arbitrarily arrested and in some cases convicted for peacefully exercising their rights. 
The failure of the Congolese army and the UN peacekeeping force MONUSCO (UN 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC) to protect the civilian population led to 
a high civilian death toll and mass displacements. 
6 Chad Boko Haram stepped up attacks in the capital, N’Djamena, and around Lake Chad, 
killing and abducting civilians, and looting and destroying properties. The authorities 
took several counter-terrorism and security measures, including passing a restrictive 
anti-terrorism law. The security forces carried out arbitrary arrests and detentions. The 
Thirdly, with the partial exception of the newly-independent South Sudan, the African states 
that share both variables of dysfunction and compromised human rights are progenies 
of the post-WWII wave of decolonisation, with most to date having enjoyed the status 
sovereign autonomy for more than half a century.  They are therefore post-colonial states 
in having previously been colonised by an external power, subsequently decolonising and 
attaining formal independence. 
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Table 4 - African fragile states by year of independence
 FSI 2015 
Ranking 
State Year of 
Independence 
1 South Sudan 2011 
2 Somalia 1960 
3 Central African Republic 1960 
4 Sudan 1956 
5 D.R. of the Congo 1960 
6 Chad 1960 
10 Guinea 1958 
14 Nigeria 1960 
15 Cote d’Ivoire 1960 
16 Zimbabwe 1980 
Of course, it is true that almost all of Africa’s current 54 states are post-colonial states in one 
way or another, the continent having been extensively colonised in the eighteenth century. 
Furthermore, relatively functional post-colonial African states such as Botswana, Senegal, 
Benin and Ghana possess respectable human rights records.  Even though these states 
represent a small minority in the African context, their human rights performance suggests 
that there is no automatic correlation between post-colonial African states and the erosion 
of human rights.  Nonetheless, the preceding discussion would appear to point towards 
a distinctive interaction between the variables of human rights abuse, state dysfunction 
and post-coloniality, especially in Africa.  The remainder of this article be devoted to 
understanding the dynamics of this trifecta, by drawing on the theoretical contributions of 
Robert Jackson, who has done more than any other scholar in the fields of international law 
and political science to chart the complex relationship postcolonial sovereignty and state 
dysfunction, according to his conceptualisation of ‘quasi-states’.1
3. A post-war reconfiguration of international society
During the immediate post-war period in the international political environment became 
receptive to the ideas of anti-colonial ideologies (spurred on by the success of the Civil Rights 
Movement in the United States) amongst which the notion of self-determination featured 
centrally.  The United Nations (UN), in particular, played a pivotal role in discrediting the 
premise of colonialism through the promulgation of its Charter (1945), and documents such 
1	 Jackson’s	concept	of	‘quasi-states’	is	employed	in	many	introductory	and	advanced	books	in	the	field	
of International Relations.  Recent examples include Chandler D, International State-building: The 
Rise of Post-Liberal Governance. New York: Routledge, 2010, p. 47.; Lake D, Hierarchy in Internation-
al Relations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009, p. 39.; Nexon D, The Struggle for Power in Early 
Modern	Europe:	Religious	Conflict,	Dynastic	Empires	and	International	Change.	Princeton:	Princeton	
University Press, 2009, p. 58.; and Thomson A, An Introduction to African Politics. New York: Rout-
ledge, 2010, p. 77.
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as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which acquired significant moral and 
legal momentum.  As a result, European colonial powers were unable to sustain widespread 
belief in the legitimacy of colonialism.  The growing tide of international criticism and 
censure pressured these powers to initiate a process of decolonisation that, once begun, 
snowballed as dozens of colonies clamoured for immediate independence, citing the 
newfound international morality of the era.  The central and overarching principle was a 
jarring juxtaposition to what had hitherto been accepted in international relations, and held 
that all colonial peoples are entitled to be independent regardless of their culture, race, 
wealth, geography or any such criterion (Jackson, 2007:16).  
Put differently, no prerequisite of political viability prevented colonies from attaining 
independence, since self-determination became a fundamental norm – that is, a right.  
However, the abolition of a colonial hierarchy of states and its subsequent replacement with 
egalitarianism has failed to bring an end to the de facto practice differentiation between 
states.  The persistent stratification of states, decades after colonialism, is most acutely 
emphasised by the different adjectives that have emerged to describe various tiers of 
state capacity (including ‘fragile states’).  Formerly, the world was divided into metropolitan 
powers and colonies or dependencies.  These two categories have largely continued to exist 
(albeit clad in a postcolonial idiom) as developed, developing and less-developed states. 
The sphere of less-developed states also harbours a significant number of dysfunctional 
states.  As Jackson (2007:18) notes:
Today in addition however there is a North-South gap between states disclosed by 
profoundly unequal standards of living which cannot be altered fundamentally by 
international agreements and diplomacy.  The division is likely to persist indefinitely 
regardless of international decisions to the contrary because it is rooted in deep-
seated cultural, material, and even psychological conditions of sovereign states.
What has, in essence, been fundamentally altered are the international rules of the game 
concerning the ‘obligation to be a colony and the right to be a sovereign state’ (Jackson, 
2007:21).
This, then, is the central premise of this investigation’s approach to evaluating the nexus 
between postcolonial sovereignty, state dysfunction, and human rights – namely that, not 
unlike colonial times, an international order of strong and weak states is being perpetuated 
with little substantive change in state capabilities and government, being instead merely 
nominally reconfigured according to the formal requirements of international egalitarianism.
4. A differentiated approach to postcolonial sovereignty
A differentiated conceptualisation of sovereignty is integral to understanding the rights 
and obligations of quasi-states in the contemporary international world order, according 
to which the dual nature of postcolonial sovereignty may be expressed in terms of its 
positive and negative manifestations.  These notions of positive and negative sovereignty2 
are premised on Isiah Berlin’s influential cognate ideas of negative and positive liberty. 
Berlin (1969:122) defines negative liberty as the area within which an individual can act 
unobstructed by others.  Negative liberty provides individuals freedom from interference, 
and thus presupposes the self-determined nature of that individual’s existence.  Curtailment 
of an individual’s negative liberty is only justified when he/she harms or threatens or acts 
maliciously toward others – the so-called harm principle (Mill, 1861:21).
2	 The	theoretical	differentiation	of	sovereignty	has	also	notably	been	conducted	by	Stephen	Krasner	
who	identifies	four	variations	of	sovereignty.		Several	of	Krasner’s	insights	are	based	upon	Jackson’s	
analysis	of	quasi-states.	See	Krasner	SD,	Sovereignty:	Organised	Hypocrisy.	Princeton:	Princeton	
University Press, 1999, pp. 34.
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Analogously, negative sovereignty (as applied to states) can be defined as freedom from 
outside interference, in a formal-legal sense.  In this application, possessing sovereignty 
and being free from outside intervention represent two sides of the same juridical coin.  It 
is also the central principle upon which the law of nations and the Weberian conception of 
statehood is premised – the notion that each state has exclusive legal jurisdiction in its own 
territory, free from incursion by other states.  Accordingly, Jackson (2007:27) notes that:
Negative sovereignty as regards quasi-states primarily involves decolonisation: 
it is the distinctive liberty acquired by former colonies as a consequence of the 
international enfranchisement movement ... It is a formal legal entitlement and 
therefore something which the international society is capable of conferring.
Thus, negative sovereignty could be described as a passive attribute, since it is not dependent 
on any conditions or positive actions by a given state (as holder of sovereignty).  Rather, it 
rests on the observance and forbearance of other states in the international community of 
sovereign states.  
In contrast, positive liberty (as conceptualised by Berlin) consists of being one’s own master. 
Thus, where negative liberty is interpreted as freedom from, positive liberty is freedom 
to: being active, self-directive, exercising choice, and pursuing and realising goals (Berlin, 
1969:131).3  Positive sovereignty likewise presupposes capabilities that enable governments 
to be their own masters and is, therefore, a substantive (empirical) rather than a formal 
condition or status that may be conferred – it is not a legal, but a political attribute.4 
Therefore, a positively sovereign state is one that not only enjoys rights of non-intervention 
and other international immunities, but also possesses the wherewithal to provide political 
goods and protection for its citizens and, as such, positive sovereignty could be considered 
the distinctive overall feature of a ‘developed’ state.
Although all internationally recognised states enjoy the rights which negative sovereignty 
guarantees (such as autonomous diplomatic relations and non-intervention) only some 
possess the capabilities to maximise the advantage of their independence.  Yet is worth 
noting that the ability to achieve substantive positive sovereignty is neither a function of a 
particular state’s size, nor its power, and that functional small states and dysfunctional large 
states have existed throughout history.  Both in economic and geographic terms, states such 
Denmark, Luxembourg, Singapore, and New Zealand are dwarfed by other neighbouring 
states or proximate regional powers, yet these small states are able to provide for their 
populations as well as any state and better than most .  It is therefore not a question of 
being a dwarf or a giant among states, but rather, of being a state in organised domestic 
reality and not merely according to the letter of international law.
Through their domestic incapacity, dysfunctional quasi-states lack positive sovereignty and 
many of the concomitant positive (empirical) attributes of statehood, such as means to act 
as guardian of their citizens’ human rights.  In certain cases, these states may exist merely by 
virtue of their inherent rights, enshrined according to negative sovereignty, which maintain 
them with little trace of the features that typify authentic self-determination. Such states 
are the product of a new postcolonial arrangement of sovereignty that stands in contrast to 
the conventional, evolutionary development of sovereignty over the last 500 years.
3	 	Berlin	I,	Four	Essays	on	Liberty.	London:	Oxford	University	Press,	1969,	p.	131.
4 Marshall’s description of sovereignty is predicated especially upon the capabilities of states, and 
serves as a good example of the classical (positive) conceptualisation of sovereignty.  Whilst its length 
prohibits its quotation here, Marshall’s conceptualisation captures the essence of classical positive 
sovereignty (which Jackson employs in his own work). See Marshall C, The Exercise of Sovereignty. 
Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	Press,	1965,	p.	5.
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5. Old and new sovereignty regimes
It was noted previously that in terms of the prevailing international legal framework, 
sovereignty implies constitutional independence from other states, meaning that a state’s 
constitution is not part of a larger constitutional arrangement (James, 1986:25).  By the 
same token, there can be no half-measure, or semi-sovereignty – a state is either wholly 
sovereign or subject to a measure of control by another sovereign state and therefore 
not sovereign.  Historically, various types of non-sovereign entities existed that were 
maintained by imperial powers such as protectorates, colonies, mandates, trust territories 
or condominiums (Grossman, 2001:858; Fawcett, 1949:86-107).  These aforementioned 
political-constitutional arrangements entailed legal subordination to a foreign power – 
effectively the denial of sovereignty.  Jackson (2007:48) remarks that the manner in which 
colonial independence was expedited has:
... resulted in the formation for the first time of two simultaneous games of 
sovereignty within universal international society: the continuing demanding 
‘hardball’ game based on positive sovereignty, and a new, softer, third division 
game derived from negative sovereignty ... The new game is the North-South 
‘dialogue’ which is the successor of Western colonialism.  It is in many respects a 
collaborative regime fashioned to replace the imperial orders which governed non-
Western areas in the past ... What is fundamentally changed, therefore, is not the 
geographical distribution of power in the world.  Rather, it is the moral and legal 
framework of the states-system and the way that underdeveloped parts of the 
world are supported externally.  
The rules of the sovereignty game are influenced by the fundamental reality of the 
plural nature of states in an international system.  Collectively, these rules maintain the 
constitutional independence of states, observing legal equality between states, mutual 
recognition, jurisdiction, non-intervention, entering into and honouring treaties, diplomacy, 
and a broad framework of international law that even regulates violent conflict between 
states in a rule-bound playing field protecting non-combatants and other spectators.5   Thus, 
the aforementioned rules include every convention and practice of international life that 
serve to moderate and civilise the relations of states.6  The classical international game of 
sovereignty is therefore essentially a game of liberty, as discussed previously with reference 
to Berlin. It represents the overarching central institution in a liberal political order as it 
‘exists to order the relations of states, prevent damaging collisions between them, and – 
when they do occur – regulate the conflicts and restore peace’ (Jackson, 2007:34).
Traditionally, therefore, besides being positively capable entities, states are also viewed as 
intrinsically valuable and worth protecting and preserving, since they provide the necessary 
conditions of the good life to their citizens.  Consequently, each sovereign player aims to 
achieve advantage and gain through the pursuance of its foreign policy, mindful of the fact that 
irreverence towards rules will destroy the game itself, including the valuable political goods 
and independence that derive from it.  Ultimately, then, the national interest of sovereign 
states is the protection and preservation of their own way of life, through preserving the 
rules of the game.  Historically, the prominent players of this classical sovereignty game 
were generally functional, empirically sovereign, often Western states.  In the traditional 
sovereignty game, efficacy of government was a supporting pillar of sovereign statehood, 
whereby the supreme authoritative power resided in a particular territorial unit and evolved 
from ‘within’.  Demonstrable capacity for survival and self-government created credibility 
and esteem that warranted recognition beyond one’s borders – sovereigns therefore preceded 
5  Such rules would include, for example, The Hague (1907) and Geneva (1949) Conventions
6	 A	notion	first	arrived	at	by	Hugo	Grotius,	upon	which	the	rationalist	conception	of	international	
relations is largely based
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sovereignty.  Kelsen (1945:29) underscored the requirement of functionality for participation 
in the classical sovereignty game when he argued that:
A national legal order begins to be valid as soon as it has become, on the whole, 
efficacious, and ceases to be valid as soon as it loses this efficacy.
If Kelsen’s test of validity continued to be applied today, many states in the developing world 
would not be regarded as sovereign (as a cursory evaluation of the Fragile States Index 
would confirm).  Indeed, it is true that the original and most successful participants of the 
old sovereignty game were governments that had successfully asserted sovereignty in the 
past, had never surrendered sovereignty or succumbed to another state, and consequently 
had a strong historical right to play the game.  When the United States achieved freedom 
from the British Empire through its War of Independence or when Japan eluded Western 
imperialism, empirical statehood and the accompanying positive title to sovereignty was 
capably demonstrated.  The players of the old sovereignty game therefore excluded the 
various less significant colonies and dependencies that existed at the time.  It was, as Kreijen 
(2004:51) notes, a game for the ‘big boys’.
6. The emergence of self-determination as paramount 
principle
Subsequent to the constitutional-political strata of dependencies being eliminated from 
the international legal order, sovereignty became conferrable upon any entity based on 
the normative moral criteria of self-determination.  Whilst the philosophical notion of 
self-determination had been part of liberal thought since the eighteenth century, it was 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points that precipitated its incorporated as part of a normative 
framework for international relations, when he argued for: 
A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, 
based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such 
questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have 
equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be 
determined.7 
However, it was only after another world war that the principle of self-determination 
became formally integrated into the framework of international law under the auspices of 
the UN.  Since then, it has figured prominently in the UN’s most influential declarations and 
documents and, as such, came to represent a ius cogens norm:
• Chapter 1, Article 1, part 2 of the UN Charter states that purpose of the 
charter is: ‘To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.’
• Article 1 of both the CCPR and the CESCR read: ‘All peoples have the right 
of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural devel-
opment.’
• The UDHR, Article 15, states that everyone has the right to a nationality and 
that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of a nationality or denied the 
right to change nationality.
7 Wilson’s Fourteen Points were drafted after the First World War, according to which the principle 
of	national	self-determination	was	applied	to	the	breakup	of	the	Austrian,	German	and	Ottoman	
Empires.   The principle of national self-determination is also embodied in the UN Declaration on the 
Granting	of	Independence	of	Colonial	Countries	and	Peoples	(1960),	and	in	the	Declaration	of	the	
Principles of International Law (1970).   
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It is on the basis of these articles, and the normative shift they signified, that erstwhile 
liberation movements justified their struggle against colonialism from the position of the 
moral and juridical high ground.  Of course, the concept of self-determination is in itself 
just, and concurs with the broad liberal-democratic tradition that acknowledges the human 
rights of the individual and many other virtuous principles that collectively promote a 
civilised human existence.  However, it has been argued that enshrining self-determination 
as an unconditional right resulted in the crucial determinant of state feasibility being wholly 
disregarded – in fact, it was quickly relegated to the ranks of political incorrectness.   It 
represents, therefore, an extreme example of idealism triumphing over realism.  Its extreme 
idealism was demonstrated by the fact that aspirant indigenous governments had neither 
the social nor the institutional control, authority, and functional capabilities to consolidate 
and develop statehood (decades later, indices such as the Fragile States Index and Freedom 
in the World bear stark witness to this).
7. A corollary to self-determination – the right to non-
intervention
If the right to self-determination serves as the legal grounds for the founding of states in the 
postcolonial era, the right to non-intervention serves as a mechanism to perpetuate their 
existence.  According to UN resolution 2131:
In fulfilment of the principle of self-determination, the General Assembly, in the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
contained in resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960, stated its conviction 
that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of 
their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory, and that, by virtue 
of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development ... All States shall respect the right 
of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely 
exercised without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Consequently, all States shall contribute to the 
complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations.
This resolution links the concepts of self-determination and non-intervention with the 
purpose of establishing permanent (inviolable) postcolonial states.  Presumably, the guiding 
purpose of this resolution (given its ratification in 1965) was to prevent the re-emergence 
of colonialism and the acquisition of territorial possessions by states capable of doing 
so.  It can be said, almost fifty years later, that this goal has been achieved.  Colonialism 
did not re-emerge in the post-war period, and is as of today a non-existent feature of 
international relations.  However, the doctrine of non-intervention has also hermetically 
sealed the postcolonial configuration of states, eliminating the possibilities of subsequent 
self-determination for ethnic groups or nationalities other than those represented by 
liberation movements in the struggle for independence.  The volatile and acute nature of 
this configuration has been demonstrated frequently in recent history, where fragmented 
societies (consisting of multiple ethnicities, religions, or languages) are contained within 
postcolonial territorial boundaries, and civil conflict subsequently emerges during which 
one side is normally supported by the state.  
Thus, the post-war formalisation of national self-determination as a sufficient and necessary 
ground for sovereignty and constitutional independence prompted the emergence of a new 
sovereignty game.  The doctrine of independence based upon the right of self-determination 
not only established ex-colonies’ categorical right to independence, it also cemented the 
permanent inviolability of these territories.  Furthermore, it was no longer seen as a positive 
right of national self-determination (as very few modern states emerge concurrently with, or 
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from, nations).  It instead became an exclusive negative right of ex-colonies, which typically 
contain a multitude of ethnic and tribal entities and rarely a homogenous ethnic community. 
The right to self-determination therefore became, first and foremost, an instrument toward 
anti-colonial liberation (Jackson, 2007:41).  However, various nations and communities 
that were not colonies argued for their right to independence based upon the doctrine of 
self-determination and have been denied by the rules of the new sovereignty game.  The 
‘accidents of imperial history’ have consigned them to the status of outcasts in the current 
sovereignty game, even where they represent de facto governments in effective control of 
territory.   Examples in Africa include Igbos, Tuaregs, Sahrawis, Furs, Baganda amongst other 
ethno-nationalities worldwide, which have been referred to as ‘stateless nations’.8  Several 
of these nations are denied independence since geographically they form part of former 
colonies of which the sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be challenged or amended 
in the current international order of states, due to the dictates of negative sovereignty and 
non-intervention.  Subsequently, these peoples are often relegated to a rogue status and 
described as separatists, secessionists or irredentists (indeed, many have chosen violence 
as a means to further their political goal of independence).  Additionally, ethnic minorities in 
African states have frequently been persecuted by postcolonial governments, culminating 
in genocides such as those in Zanzibar (1964), Burundi (1972), Rwanda (1993), and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (1998-2003) where gross abuses of human rights were 
perpetrated.
Therefore, to a significant extent, national self-determination has transformed into a 
reactionary right of quasi-states in the postcolonial world.  The leaders of such states 
are generally determined to prohibit ‘secessionist’ ethno-nationalities from attaining 
independence, since it would involve loss of jurisdiction over the territories in question and 
the redrawing of international frontiers, which could threaten internal and regional power 
relations.   With regards to this conservative interpretation of the right to self-determination, 
it has been noted that international and national decision-makers decided to follow the 
route of uti possidetis, whereby the geographical integrity of newly-independent states 
emerging during decolonisation was seen as a paramount goal – at the expense of minority 
groups with legitimate claims to national self-determination (Labuschagne, 2006:78-92). 
Whilst granting independence to ethnic minorities based upon the principle of national self-
determination may in certain instances create viable states, the sheer number of aspirant 
minorities poses a risk of regional fragmentation and destabilisation. Regardless, the 
principle of true national self-determination is one that has been rendered obsolete with 
the completion of decolonisation – and it emerged from this process that the only truly self-
determined groups were those represented (often narrowly and exclusively) by victorious 
liberation movements.
8. The adverse impact of negative sovereignty on human 
rights
The ascendancy of the doctrine of self-determination has created indigenous governments 
in the developing world, but has simultaneously subjected many populations to unstable 
and predatory regimes in the form of dysfunctional states that often employ their sovereign 
privileges as a foil in neglecting or abusing human rights within their borders, as reported 
by NGOs such as Amnesty International and Freedom House.  This outcome is not only 
deeply saddening but also profoundly ironic, since many of the liberation movements that 
led the charge for colonial independence did so on the basis of a moral and normative 
appeal in which human rights was the central pillar.  In certain instances these self-same 
8 The cases of Scots, Catalans and Gibraltarians have also been cited as cases of ’stateless nations’. See 
Keating	M,	‘Stateless	Nation-Building:	Quebec,	Catalonia	and	Scotland	in	the	Changing	State	System’,	
Nations	and	Nationalism,	3,	4,	1997,	pp.	689-717;	and	Azopardi	K,	Sovereignty	and	the	Stateless	
Nation: Gibraltar in the Modern Legal Context. Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009.
 2017 | https://doi.org/10.19108/KOERS.82.1.2307 Page 14 of 19
Original Research www.koersjournal.org.za
liberation movements are still governing, often with scant regard for issues of human rights 
in their domestic contexts.  This jarring contradiction was underscored in 2008 when Robert 
Mugabe remarked, referring to ZANU PF, that ‘We, not the British, established democracy 
based on one person, one vote - democracy which rejected racial or gender discrimination 
and upheld human rights and religious freedom’ (WikiNews, 2008).
Indeed, the prevailing negative sovereignty regime bears important domestic consequences 
with regards to human rights for those living in dysfunctional quasi-states.  In the same 
manner that the inviolable right of non-intervention prohibits donors of development 
assistance in dictating the application of such assistance, the international community is 
similarly constrained in preventing abuses of human rights in dysfunctional states (Kreijen, 
2004:97).  Buzan (1983:3) describes this situation in dysfunctional states as the ‘paradox of 
the state’ according to which states and their governments become a source of threat to 
their citizens, rather than security, representing what has been referred to as a ‘predatory 
state’ (Diamond, 2008:36).  Some have even gone as far as to label the postcolonial African 
state as ‘a terrorist organisation masquerading as the repository of popular will’ (Mutua, 
1995:489).  To be sure, citizenship in dysfunctional states is often scarcely more than a 
nominal status with little or no real substantive privilege, since dysfunctional states are (at 
best) incapable of delivering political goods, and may even predate upon the citizens whom 
the social contract enjoins them to protect.  
It has been argued that the expansion of the community of states brought about by 
decolonisation has not resulted in a corresponding extension of human rights protection, but 
instead increased opportunity for human rights violations (Freeman, 2005:243-245).  Such 
atrocities have come to be vividly publicised by international humanitarian organisations 
and NGOs, cited previously.  As a result, public perceptions relating to human rights abuses 
are more acute than ever, especially in the developed world where ‘the comparative civility of 
Western states and the corresponding expectations of their populations have undoubtedly 
created heightened awareness of inhumanity everywhere’ (Jackson, 2007:141).
The advent of contemporary international human rights law and its incorporation as ius 
cogens is therefore an important admission that sovereign states cannot automatically be 
considered civil states9 – the poor human rights record of many dysfunctional postcolonial 
states as well as supposedly developed states would attest to this.  Yet, even if the common 
law of mankind cannot be enforced without the co-operation of the states involved in human 
rights violations, which is obviously difficult to secure, it nevertheless constitutes not only 
a moral but a legal standard for attempting to bring them to some accountability (Jackson, 
2007:145).   Conversely however, the dilemma of enforcing human rights in dysfunctional 
and quasi-states is compounded by the rights of negative sovereignty and non-intervention 
by such states, and the fact that in certain instances human rights violations are condoned 
and executed by the state itself (Buzan’s notion of predatory states).  Therefore, it stands to 
reason that the precarious status of human rights in dysfunctional states could in part be 
attributed to the current postcolonial negative sovereignty regime, which inaugurated and 
perpetuates uncivil rule in such states.
Indeed, many dysfunctional states in which human rights are abused adopt overtly hostile 
postures in their international relations, especially surrounding issues of human rights. 
Invariably, external attempts to secure human rights in these states are portrayed by leaders 
as conspiracies to meddle in domestic affairs and undermine their national sovereignty. 
For example, during a 2004 visit to Venezuela, President Robert Mugabe stressed the 
importance of poor countries co-operating to build ‘integrated, strong economies able to 
resist the dominance of the North’, whilst President Hugo Chavez remarked in a speech in 
9 By far the most authoritative discussion on the notions of civility and civilisation are conducted by RG 
Collingwood.  His perspectives are well worth engaging, although constraints of space prohibit such a 
detour	in	this	paper.		See	Collingwood	RG,	The	New	Leviathan.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1944.
 2017 | https://doi.org/10.19108/KOERS.82.1.2307 Page 15 of 19
Original Research www.koersjournal.org.za
honour of his Zimbabwean counterpart that ‘We are confronting conspiracies and coups 
supported by Washington, whose government is once again charging with the fiercest 
flags of imperialism’ (News24, 2004).  The decision of International Criminal Court (ICC) to 
prosecute Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for seven counts of crimes against humanity 
was interpreted by Bashir’s regime as proof that the ICC has ‘consigned Africa only as a 
laboratory for politically motivated prosecutions’ (International Refugee Rights Initiative, 
2008).  Similarly, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni accused the ICC of ‘blackmail’ and 
attempting to ‘install leaders of their choice in Africa and eliminate the ones they do not 
like’ (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2013).  Leaders in postcolonial Africa frequently 
lament the existence of a ‘new conspiracy to recolonize it in the name of democracy’ by 
Western states in order to the natural resources of the continent (Ghana Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2011), whilst former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo accused the West of 
‘a project of destabilization and fragmentation of peace and social cohesion’ after violence 
occurred when he refused to acknowledge his 2010 electoral defeat (Cocks, 2010).10  
Thus, the doctrine of non-intervention is often implicitly or explicitly invoked by regimes as a 
stratagem to obstruct international involvement in domestic crises, from which it becomes 
evident that the extent of state dysfunction makes any constructive domestic intervention 
unlikely.  For example in July 2008 under the agenda item entitled ‘Peace and security in 
Africa’, the UN Security Council failed to adopt a draft resolution by which the Council would 
have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe.  The representative of Zimbabwe strongly opposed 
any Council action against his country, emphasising that the draft resolution was a clear 
abuse of Chapter VII of the Charter. He held that it was not the role of the Council to certify 
national elections of member states and that Zimbabweans had a right to choose their own 
leaders (UN, 2008:33-34).  In this instance, solidarity with the Zimbabwean representative 
was shown by Vietnam and Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya (both rotating member states of 
the Security Council that time with dubious human rights records).  However, the right 
of non-intervention is applied selectively by many dysfunctional states, particularly in the 
interaction with other states of the developing world.  For example, the UN (2008:17) noted 
that in the period 2008-2009: 
There were a number of instances in which the Council condemned hostile acts 
across the border of a State and the support by States of foreign armed groups, 
including through use of their territory. In particular, the Council constantly 
encouraged the respective Governments of the Sudan, Chad and the Central 
African Republic to ensure that their territories were not used to undermine 
the sovereignty of others and to cooperate with a view to putting an end to the 
activities of armed groups in the region and their attempts to seize power by force.
The reader will recall that the Sudan, Chad and the CAR feature prominently in the FSI 
and rank poorly in in the protection of human rights (see Table 1).  However, the most 
problematic contemporary example of the selective and often duplicitous application of 
the right to non-intervention as it relates to dysfunctional states can be found in the DRC. 
The Second Congo War (1998-2003) destabilised the entire region, resulting in numerous 
related hostilities such as the Lord’s Resistance Army Insurgency (active in South Sudan, 
Central African Republic, and the DRC), and the Kivu (eastern DRC) and Ituri (northern DRC) 
conflicts.  Neighbouring states were drawn into the conflict, either in support of (Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, Angola, Chad, Sudan) or fighting against the DRC (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi). 
Belligerents in the DRC conflict also fought amongst themselves in related but separate 
conflicts (Rwanda vs. Uganda), and armed non-state groups were co-opted to the various 
conflicting blocs.  The resulting complex and confusing morass of conflict exhibits many 
10 Incidentally, Laurent Gbagbo subsequently hired two prominent French lawyers to provide legal 
counsel,	of	which	one	is	Jacques	Vergès,	notorious	for	defending	Klaus	Barbie,	a	Gestapo	officer	
known as the ‘Butcher of Lyon’, and for his association with terrorist Carlos the Jackal and Serbian 
dictator Slobodan Milosevic.
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instances of wanton disregard for the right of non-intervention, so prized by postcolonial 
states in their dealings with the Global North.  A UN Report (2002:8) of the Panel of Experts 
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC 
concluded that:
Criminal groups linked to the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have benefited from 
the micro-conflicts. They have built up a self-financing war economy centred on 
mineral exploitation ... The Governments of Rwanda and Zimbabwe, as well as 
powerful individuals in Uganda, have adopted other strategies for maintaining 
the mechanisms for revenue generation, many of which involve criminal activities, 
once their troops have departed.
It is therefore evident that the tenets of negative sovereignty may be asserted by 
dysfunctional states in a duplicitous manner.  On the one hand, dealings with states of the 
developed world are conducted from a de jure position whereby negative sovereignty grants 
freedom from external intervention, as well as a de facto normative appeal for development 
assistance or financial aid.  On the other hand, as far as postcolonial peers and issues of 
human rights are concerned, dysfunctional states exhibit a much more pragmatic approach 
to the international norms to which they routinely appeal in their relations with the Global 
North.  
9. Concluding perspectives
As noted in the introduction, the goal of this article was to explore and understand the 
interrelationship between state dysfunction, postcolonial states and human rights in the 
African context.  From the empirical perspectives on state dysfunction and human rights 
respectively, it was evident that there exists a significant overlap between states that are 
dysfunctional and states in which human rights are routinely abused or entirely neglected. 
On the other hand, it was demonstrated that states which are generally considered 
to be functional and stable tend to observe and enforce human rights domestically. 
Furthermore, it was noted that most African states are also postcolonial states, and that 
in order to understand the current context of state dysfunction and human rights abuse, 
the historical dynamics of decolonisation (in both political and international legal terms) 
must be accounted for.  To this end, the theoretical contribution of Robert Jackson focusing 
on quasi-states and negative sovereignty was employed.  Jackson’s argument centres on 
the evolving nature of sovereignty in the post-war era during which many former colonies 
attained independence and subsequently became so-called quasi-states.  The essence of 
this process of change is represented below:  
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Table 5 - Comparison of sovereignty regimes
Historical and Current Sovereignty Regimes 
Old TYPE New 
Positive ORIENTATION Negative 
Developed world  
[Global North] 
OCCURRENCE Developing world  
[Global South] 
Evolutionary  
[Since 1648] 
DEVELOPMENT Revolutionary 
[Decolonisation] 
Power + Competition 
[Empirical capabilities] 
FOUNDATION Self-determination 
[Moral/legal doctrine] 
Assistance to 
developing states 
OBLIGATIONS Marginal 
Generally functional STATE ATTRIBUTES Generally dysfunctional 
 
The realpolitik of this situation is essentially that postcolonial states exist, and are held 
accountable, according to a different set of norms, notwithstanding the supposedly 
universal and indivisible concept of sovereign statehood in international law.  Negative 
sovereignty and its components may be deployed by quasi-states, not only to conceal or 
defend their dysfunction, but also to obstruct and abuse the human rights of their citizens 
with relative impunity.  
The threat which the negative sovereignty paradigm poses to international human rights, 
and that has been demonstrated in this article, is best encapsulated by former Secretary-
General of the UN, Kofi Annan, when he remarked that:
[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?.  
The emergence of negative sovereignty as a tacit set of rules serves to reaffirm the 
fundamentally unequal nature of the international community of states, and the dangers 
implicit in ignoring such discrepancies in capabilities and civility at the expense of citizens 
in dysfunctional states.  Moreover, by including the variable of state dysfunction into the 
analysis of human rights abuses, this article supports the notion that domestic conditions 
contribute at least as to the problem as international relations do.  Henderson (2009:32) 
provides a perspective on this situation when he argues that:
[…] the combination of low levels of interstate war and high levels of intrastate 
(i.e. civil) war suggests the inversion of conflict processes in Africa. That is, in 
Africa, international politics has been ‘domesticated’, with interstate conflicts often 
resolved non-violently in the way that one would expect of domestic conflicts, 
while domestic politics has been ‘internationalized’, with domestic disputes often 
resolved violently in a manner usually reserved for interstate disputes.
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Such an inversion would suggest that the most important bulwark against human rights 
abuses are states themselves.  Whereas functional states have the institutional and political 
means to manage and diffuse conflict that may lead to human rights abuses, dysfunctional 
states do not possess such capability.   Furthermore, in many dysfunctional states, the 
institutions of state are complicit in the perpetrations of human rights violations (particularly 
in authoritarian regimes), whilst in others, systemic dysfunction has rendered the state 
incapable of intervention (Greffrath, 2015:252).  Viewed from this vantage point, human 
rights violations represent the devastating repercussion of breaching the social compact.  
This article previously recounted how the international community discredited and 
delegitimised colonialism in the 21st century through means of changes in international 
norms legal principles.  Moreover, this feat was achieved in a remarkably short period of 
time, and with a moral solidarity that was not seen since the abolition of slavery.  In the 
same manner, international legal orthodoxy must be re-evaluated if it serves to degrade 
the civility upon which the international community of states is premised – particularly if 
certain sacrosanct rights of states are maintained at the expense of individual human rights 
domestically.  The plight of human rights in the postcolonial world is no less of an aberration 
than slavery and colonialism, and like those stains on the record of humankind, it can only 
be remedied through the collective will of those capable members of the international 
community.  It may be considered a tragic irony that the United Nations, which stood 
at the vanguard of decolonisation half a century ago as its leading moral authority and 
collective political embodiment, is now in large part occupied with remedying the abuses 
of human rights in those self-same postcolonial states.  Noting this, one may be inclined 
to view the UN as an appropriate ‘one size fits all’ corporate approach to dealing with 
human rights abuses.  However, this paper has contended that such an assumption would 
be incongruous, since the onus rests on individual governments to promote and maintain 
civility within their respective sovereign domains.  As such, it is imperative that any remedy 
must begin, domestically, with the ‘do’s’ of governance, rather than the ‘don’ts’ of negative 
sovereignty. 
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